CPPI is the ONLY clean measure of actual transaction prices on the SAME asset over time, apples-to-apples pricing trajectory via paired repeat sales. Cap rate changes confound asset quality differences; CPPI controls for that. The canonical institutional benchmark (MSCI Real Capital Analytics CPPI published monthly with 10+ year history, Green Street Commercial Property Price Index, RCA repeat-sales tracker). Mid-2026 picture (normalized to 100 at 2022 peak): Aggregate 93 (-7% from peak, recovering, +4% YoY); Industrial 104 (+4%, FULLY recovered, only asset class above peak, logistics adjacent to gateway ports + reshoring corridors leading); Hotel 99 (-1%, near recovered, RevPAR-led with leisure markets at +5% premium); Multifamily 97 (-3%, gateway markets leading); Retail 92 (-8%, bifurcated, necessity-anchored at +2% vs Class B/C malls at -25% to -35%); Mixed-Use 92 (-8%, blended); Office 78 (-22%, still declining slowly, CBD trophy at -35% from 2019 peak). Aggregate index troughed Q2 2024 at 88; ~50% recovered in 6 quarters. Cycle position bands: peak / early-decline / mid-decline / trough / early-recovery / mid-recovery / expansion. Historical cycle context: RTC 1989-1995 -28% over 14 quarters with 22-quarter recovery (office-led, distressed acquisitions delivered exceptional returns); GFC 2008-2014 -35% over 8 quarters with 18-quarter recovery (2010-2012 value-add 20%+ IRR); COVID 2020 -8% over 3 quarters with 6-quarter recovery (V-shaped except office); current 2022-2026 rate cycle -12% over 9 quarters with 14-quarter recovery (in progress). Distinct from Transaction Volume (count of deals) and Distress Pricing (forced sales): CPPI is the cleanest measure of ACTUAL PRICING. Critical for asset-class allocation timing.
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Phase 3 begins: live market data overlay (FRED Treasury / SOFR / CPI / inflation expectations) + 18 more institutional analytics. Live macro frame, deal-vs-market positioning, deterministic engine guarantee preserved (Cherry Street regression byte-identical with seeded fallbacks). 90 modules shipped today.
Distress is where institutional capital meets dislocation. The pricing of distressed transactions sets the FLOOR for the asset class; institutional investors backstop prices when they step in to acquire at recoverable yields. The volume and pricing trajectory tell you how deep the distress is, where the cycle is in its recovery arc, and what discount-to-stabilized institutional buyers demand. Mid-2026 distress picture: CMBS special servicing 9.0% (peaked 10% mid-2024, trending -100 bps YoY = normalizing); REO inventory $35B (-30% from $50B peak Q2 2024); foreclosure starts +15% YoY but decelerating; distressed share of all transactions 12% (vs ~5% historical norm); average distressed sale discount -22% vs estimated stabilized value. Per-asset-class distress breakdown: Office severe (CBD trophy buildings in special servicing at record rates; distressed pricing -30% to -45%); Retail moderate (concentrated in Class B/C malls + big-box, necessity-anchored unaffected); Multifamily moderate (Sunbelt 2021-2022 floating-rate bridge vintage rate-cap crisis, distressed -10% to -18% with strong cash-flow recovery); Hotel minimal (recovered, residual stress in business-travel markets SF/DC); Industrial minimal (lowest distress, mega-warehouse stress only in oversupplied Inland Empire/Memphis). Module assesses cycle phase: early-distress / peak-distress / stabilizing / recovery / expansion, surfaces years-into-cycle, and expected quarters-to-next-phase. Critical for opportunistic capital deployment timing: peak-distress vintages historically deliver exceptional returns when capital deploys decisively. Production version pulls live from Trepp special servicing tracker, KBRA workout reports, MBA quarterly delinquency survey, SitusAMC REO tracker, foreclosure auction data.
Transaction volume + bid-ask spread are the cleanest real-time market temperature signals. When volume craters and bid-ask widens, markets are STUCK; buyers and sellers can't agree on price, exit liquidity is thin, repeat-sale prices fall. When both recover, the cycle is unlocked. Historical context: 2019 normalized $570B / 70 bps bid-ask; 2021 frenzied peak $810B / 50 bps (vintage 2021 cap rates re-rated 50-100 bps within 2 years); 2023 trough $325B / 350 bps (extreme dislocation, 60% decline from peak, lock-up persisted 12-15 months); 2024 modest recovery $385B; 2025 $440B; mid-2026 TTM $480B / 140 bps (+19% YoY, still 41% below cycle peak). Per asset class mid-2026: Industrial $135B (+22% YoY, 80 bps bid-ask, leading); Multifamily $165B (+18%, 110 bps, GSE-financed faster); Retail $65B (+25%, 130 bps, grocery-anchored clearing); Office $45B (+5%, 380 bps, multi-decade lows, sellers anchored to pre-COVID values vs buyers pricing distress); Hotel $38B (+30%, 175 bps, RevPAR-led); Mixed-Use $32B (+14%, 200 bps). Cross-border share 18% (below 22-25% pre-2022 norm, USD strength + tax complexity dampening foreign appetite). Average days on market 145 (normalizing from 220 trough). Market temperature bands: frozen / cold / warming / active / hot. Historical-analog table: GFC trough 2008-2009 took 24-36 months for half-recovery; 2021 frenzy preceded 50-100 bps cap re-rating. Distinct from CMBS Delinquency (debt stress), Cap-Treasury Spread (valuation), and SLOOS (lending standards): this measures actual TRANSACTIONAL liquidity. Production version pulls live from RCA / MSCI / Green Street trackers.
When LPs are UNDER-allocated to CRE vs target, they're ADDING capital, favorable for sponsors raising new funds and for asset pricing. When OVER-allocated, they're trimming. The "denominator effect" (when public markets fall, illiquid CRE becomes over-weight in the portfolio) drove much of the 2022-2024 LP pullback from CRE commitments. Mid-2026 picture: Total US institutional CRE capital $1.7T; aggregate under-allocation +1.4pp; commitment trend +12% YoY = modest inflow signal. Per LP type detail: Public Pensions 8% actual / 10% target (UNDER, actively adding; CalPERS, NYSCRF, CalSTRS, Florida SBA, Texas TRS, Ohio PERS); Endowments & Foundations 15% / 14% (at-target stable; Yale, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford); Sovereign Wealth Funds 5% / 7% (UNDER, adding; ADIA UAE, GIC Singapore, Norway NBIM, CIC China, QIA Qatar, KIA Kuwait); Insurance Companies 6% / 6% (at-target stable; MetLife, Prudential, NY Life, Allianz, Northwestern Mutual, TIAA); Family Offices 24% / 20% (OVER, trimming, active sellers / partial-sale opportunities); DC Plans 2% / 5% (severely UNDER; $300B+ long-term opportunity flowing through interval funds BREIT/SREIT/JLL and target-date fund modernization). Denominator effect status: neutral mid-2026 (public market normalization through 2025-2026 unfroze institutional capital). Net flow signal bands: strong-inflow / modest-inflow / balanced / modest-outflow / strong-outflow. Most active LP types right now: Public Pensions, SWFs, DC / Retail. Distinct from PE Dry Powder (deployment-ready capital): this is the SOURCE, where capital is coming from and which cohorts are most active.
When banks become over-concentrated in CRE, regulators (OCC, FRB, FDIC) step in via Matters Requiring Attention (MRA) and force banks to slow CRE lending. This caps debt market liquidity well before SLOOS shows it. Regulatory threshold for supervisory concern: 300% of Tier 1 capital. Mid-2026 picture: $2.4T total bank CRE debt; large banks (G-SIBs + super-regionals) 5.8% of assets = ~$840B (diversified, healthy); regional banks 22.5% of assets = ~$1.08T (concentrated, mid-trend YoY -120 bps as banks reduce exposure); community banks 35% of assets = ~$480B (highest concentration, -180 bps YoY). 145 community banks currently exceed 300% threshold; 32 super-regional banks on active supervisory watch. Module infers likely lender tier based on deal size (money-center bank for $100M+ loans, super-regional $30-100M, regional $10-30M, community below $10M; MF defaults to GSE-pathway). Regional concentration breakdown: Northeast 28% (NY/NJ/MA/PA; Signature legacy, NYCB stress drove 2023 stress and continues to weigh); Southeast 22%; Midwest 18% (most diversified); Southwest 21% (TX MF growth-exposed); West 24% (East West Bank, Pacific Premier; ongoing regulatory pressure). Signal: ample-bank-capacity / healthy-bank-capacity / tightening-bank-capacity / constrained-bank-capacity / regulatory-stress. Distinct from SLOOS (forward-looking lending standards): this is the BALANCE SHEET capacity dimension. Production version pulls live from FRB H.8 weekly + FDIC quarterly call reports.
~$1.5T of US multifamily mortgage debt outstanding; roughly half is GSE-financed. Annual FHFA scorecard caps determine institutional MF debt liquidity: 2023 $150B → 2024 $140B (reduced) → 2025 $146B → 2026 $150B (restored to 2023 levels). When GSE caps tighten or pipeline fills early, MF debt market liquidity compresses and cap rates widen as private capital can't fully replace lost GSE volume. Mission-driven target: 50% of GSE MF loans must be affordable (<= 80% AMI standard markets, <= 100% AMI HCOL). Module is applicable for Multifamily and Mixed-Use deals (auto-skips for Office/Retail/Hotel/Industrial) and surfaces YTD utilization (mid-2026 ~42%), annualized pace, months remaining at pace, mission-driven affordability fit estimate (rent-based heuristic with HCOL adjustment), signal band (abundant-liquidity / healthy-liquidity / tightening / tight / cap-exhausted), pricing context (Fixed 5-10yr ~5.85-6.15% T+150-180; Floating SOFR+225-275, 10pp tighter than non-conforming bank or life co), and lists active GSE programs: Fannie DUS (conventional 5-30yr), Freddie Optigo / SBL (small balance up to $7.5M), Green Rewards / Green Up (10-30 bps spread reduction for ENERGY STAR), Sponsor-Initiated Affordability (SIA, 20-50 bps off for voluntary rent restrictions), Freddie LIHTC / TEBS (tax-exempt bond securitization). Critical context for MF underwriting and refinance strategy.
THE canonical institutional CRE valuation metric. Cap rate minus 10-year Treasury yield is the excess return institutional capital demands for owning illiquid, management-intensive real estate vs the risk-free rate. Historical 30-year NCREIF / RCA averages: Multifamily 200 bps (narrow due to GSE conforming demand); Industrial 250 bps (institutional darling); Office 350 bps (variable, CBD trophy narrow / Class B wide); Retail 325 bps (lifestyle / open-air); Hotel 450 bps (high operating risk premium). When spread compresses materially below historical norm = CRE OVERVALUED (2006-2007 averaged 100 bps and preceded GFC 35-45% private CRE price decline; 2021-Q1 2022 averaged 150 bps and preceded 2022-2024 cap re-rating); when spread expands above norm = CRE UNDERVALUED (2009-2010 averaged 600 bps and marked the opportunistic entry window for 2010-2014 vintage exceptional returns; 2020 Q1-Q2 brief 500 bps widening). Module surfaces deal-level spread using LIVE FRED 10Y Treasury, deviation from historical norm, percentile vs 30-year history (with anchor points at GFC peak 600 bps and dot-com peak 100 bps), signal band (overvalued / modestly-tight / fair-value / modestly-wide / undervalued), peer comparison across all CRE asset classes (which sectors are tightest vs widest right now), historical analog periods with outcomes, and scenario analysis of implied terminal value under 10Y +/-100 bps paths assuming spread snaps back to historical average. This is the metric every CRE CIO and PM watches weekly, by far the most-cited institutional valuation signal. Requires live market snapshot (FRED 10Y).
Rent comes from people who can pay. Workforce signals drive CRE demand differently by asset class. Office demand tracks white-collar / professional services job growth; Multifamily tracks real wage growth + working-age population; Retail tracks consumer income trajectory (job growth + wage growth composite); Industrial tracks logistics + manufacturing employment; Hotel tracks leisure & hospitality jobs. Module maps property type to applicable demand indicator and surfaces market strength based on composite of unemployment, job growth, and real wage growth. Bands: strong / healthy / stable / soft / stressed. Seeded library covers Austin (+2.8% jobs, 67% working-age), Nashville (+2.4%, healthcare cluster), Phoenix (+6.5% manufacturing from TSMC reshoring), Dallas (+2.5% diversified), Miami (+5.5% financial services from LatAm wealth flight), Atlanta (+2.0% diversified across logistics + film + healthcare + Hyundai EV mfg), Boston (Eds & Meds 22% of jobs, 50% bachelor's+), Seattle (still digesting tech layoffs, aerospace recovery), Ithaca (Eds & Meds anchor, 60% bachelor's+), NYC (tourism recovery, finance anchor), LA (entertainment + manufacturing decline, logistics softening). Per-industry breakdown: employment share + job growth YoY. Educational attainment, working-age share, LFPR included. Asset-class-specific implications: Phoenix mfg 6.5% drives industrial demand; Boston Eds & Meds supports premium office; Miami financial services drives high-wage MF demand. Distinct from Demographic Overlay (population/household counts): this is the LABOR MARKET dimension. Production version pulls live from BLS API (LAUS, QCEW, ACS).
The institutional decision math: when replacement-cost yield exceeds going-in cap rate, BUILDING beats buying, and that's the signal new supply is incoming with 18-36 month construction lag. Spread = Going-in Cap minus Replacement Yield. Signal bands: structural-moat (>+150 bps, new supply unfavored, competitive position strong), comfortable-buy (+50 to +150 bps), buy-build-equivalent (0 to +50 bps, supply risk elevated), build-favored (negative spread, supply risk imminent), distressed-buy (deeply negative, opportunistic entry). Forward supply risk bands: minimal / modest / elevated / imminent. Asset-class context with mid-2026 replacement cost midpoints: MF $350K/unit (garden $250K / mid-rise $350K / high-rise $450K); Office $450/SF (Class B $300 / urban Class A $450 / trophy $600+); Retail $275/SF (open-air $200 / lifestyle $275 / enclosed $350); Hotel $350K/key (limited service $200K / full $350K / luxury $500K+); Industrial $135/SF (warehouse $90 / flex $135 / cold storage $180+). Historical norms: MF +25 bps spread (narrow moat due to elastic supply); Office +75 bps but currently blown to 250+ bps in distressed CBD as cap rates re-rated faster than construction costs corrected; Hotel +150 bps (brand + entitlement moat); Industrial +50 bps (fast 12-18 month construction). Rather than counting announced pipeline, this looks at the underlying ECONOMIC INCENTIVE for new supply via the spread math. When spread compresses, new pipeline starts accelerating. Production version pulls live RLB / Cumming / Turner construction cost indices and runs against deal-level cap.
Total US CRE dry powder is the institutional capital committed to private equity funds but not yet deployed, and directly determines buyer competition at exit. Mid-2026 picture (~$650B total CRE dry powder globally, $400B+ US-focused): Core $150B at 28 months of deployment at historical pace (strong buyer competition for stabilized assets); Core-Plus $90B at 22 months (healthy); Value-Add $230B at 19 months (largest single bucket; Sunbelt-focused 2021-2022 vintages working through stressed deals, new 2025-2026 vintages deploying into distressed acquisition opportunities); Opportunistic $180B at 24 months (Blackstone Real Estate Partners XI $30B+, Brookfield Strategic Real Estate VI $18B, Starwood Distressed Opportunity Fund XIII $10B, KKR/Oaktree/Goldman/Carlyle/Cerberus all raising large vintages for the 2024-2027 maturity wall distress cycle). Module maps the deal's risk profile (LTV + lease-up years signals) to applicable strategy and surfaces dry powder size, months-of-deployment at historical pace, signal band (strong-buyer-competition / healthy-buyer-pool / neutral / thin-buyer-pool / buyer-exhaustion), cap rate compression-vs-widening implication at exit (~1.5 bps per month-of-deployment vs 18-month neutral baseline), and lists active funds currently deploying capital in the applicable strategy. Distinct from CMBS Delinquency (debt market stress) and SLOOS (bank lending standards): this is the EQUITY-side institutional buyer competition signal. Production version pulls live from Preqin / PERE / Pitchbook databases.
Public REITs are valued in real-time by the deepest pool of institutional capital. NAV premium/discount is THE earliest leading indicator of private-market repricing; historically private-market cap rates follow public-market signals with a 3-9 month lag. Greens Street Advisors maintains the canonical NAV tracker; Phase 3 first iteration uses seeded mid-2026 estimates. Mid-2026 picture: Office REITs at -22% (acute distress epicenter, recovering off -28% mid-2024 trough); Mall -22% (Class B/C stressed); Strip Center -5% (necessity retail recovered); Apartment +2% (near historical average); Industrial +5% (institutionally favored, below 2021-2022 peak +25%); Hotel -8% (recovering with RevPAR pricing power); Data Center +18% (AI infrastructure tailwind); Self-Storage +1% (near average). Module classifies signal (deep-discount / discount / fair-value / premium / elevated-premium), private-market implication (overvalued / fairly-priced / undervalued), 6-month trend direction, deviation from historical average, and historical-analog comparisons (2008-2010 GFC: Office REITs at -35% peak discount and 18 months to half-recovery; 2020 COVID: Hotel REITs at -42% trough and 9 months recovery; 2006-2007 pre-GFC: industrial / apartment premium cycle). Deal implications by signal: when public discount signals private-market overvaluation, recommend patience on entry pricing and conservative exit-cap assumptions; when public premium signals undervaluation, recommend not waiting for the bottom. Production version pulls live REIT prices vs sector NAV consensus from analyst aggregators.
Federal Reserve quarterly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), published since 1990, the canonical real-time read on bank lending standards by asset class. Surveys ~75 large US banks plus US branches of foreign banks. Net % tightening (positive = tightening) is the headline metric. When net tightening crosses 50%, historical data shows bank CRE lending volume falls 30-40% in subsequent 4 quarters. Mid-2026 Q1 SLOOS seeded picture: overall CRE +18% (modestly tightening, off the +60% peak in 2023; trajectory normalizing); Construction & Development +30% (most stressed); Multifamily +12% (most stable, GSE conforming demand cushions banks); Nonfarm Nonresidential +22% (Office still acutely tight). Module maps property type to applicable SLOOS segment, surfaces the segment-level net tightening, 4-quarter trend direction, historical percentile vs 10-year history, and demand strength reading. Severity bands: loose / neutral / tightening / tight / credit-crunch. Deal implications by severity (alternative debt source recommendations under credit-crunch, lender outreach strategy under tight, term/spread expectations under tightening). Forward-looking note explains historical resolution timelines (2008-2010: 8 quarters; 2020 pandemic: 2 quarters sharp recovery; 2022-2024 normalization: 6+ quarters). Distinct from CMBS Delinquency (backward-looking realized stress) and Lender Risk Rating (deal-level): SLOOS is the FORWARD-LOOKING lender appetite signal. Production version pulls live from FRED series DRTSCLM (commercial real estate tightening, published 6 weeks post-quarter-end).
Real-time CMBS loan performance, the cleanest institutional read on sector-level CRE stress. Sourced from Trepp / KBRA / Fitch monthly disclosures. Mid-2026 seeded picture: Office at 10.5% 60+ delinquency, 13% special servicing = acute-stress epicenter (WFH + 10yr maturity wall + record special servicing volume); Retail at 6.2% bifurcated (grocery-anchored stable, Class B/C malls 12%+); Hotel recovered to 5.8% (leisure + ADR pricing power); Multifamily 3.8% rising from Sunbelt 2021-2022 floating-rate vintage rate-cap crisis; Industrial 1.8% structurally cleanest. Module surfaces 4 key metrics: 60+ day delinquency rate, special servicing rate, 12-month trend (bps direction), historical percentile vs 10-year history. Plus per-vintage stress breakdown (2014-2016 Office at 18% vs GSE MF at 1.8%), sector narrative explaining the trajectory, deal implications (sector cap premium, lender appetite, exit liquidity expectations), and severity bands (low-stress / moderate-stress / elevated-stress / acute-stress). Production version pulls live from Trepp API or KBRA Issue Tracker. Critical IC context for asset-class-relative pricing decisions: what cap rate premium should Office command vs Industrial? What's the trajectory of stress (worsening or improving)? Module surfaces both the snapshot and the direction.
Contextualizes the deal's senior loan maturity within the $2.7T CRE refi wall (2024-2027). The wall: $300-400B of 2020 vintage 5yr loans matured into 2025; ~$400B of 2021 5yr cohort maturing through 2026; 2017 10yr loans maturing 2027 at deep pre-COVID basis; 2019 7yr loans maturing 2026 at peak-valuation basis. Each cohort has a distinct narrative: 2020-2021 is the peak-distress epicenter (low-rate origination + peak valuations + acute refi gap into current 5.5-7% rates); 2022 is rising-rate vintage; post-2023 is well-positioned. Module identifies the deal's specific cohort, surfaces the cohort-level institutional context (sizing, valuation backdrop, observed lender behavior), estimates refi rate at maturity using live FRED 10Y Treasury + Fed-path consensus (stable to 2026, 40 bps lower by 2027, 75-100 bps lower 2028+) + 125 bps CMBS AAA spread, calculates the refi gap in bps vs the modeled coupon, and recommends preparation timeline + strategy. Bands: well-positioned / manageable-wall / wall-exposure / wall-epicenter. Severity: minimal / moderate / elevated / critical. Distinct from Refi Rate Risk (rate-shift sensitivity table) and Phase 1 Refi feature (cash math): this is the macro-narrative layer answering 'is this deal IN the wall, and if so, what does the wall look like for this specific cohort?' Cherry Street (2026 origination, 7yr term → 2033 maturity): well-positioned, outside the active wall window.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of tenant industry concentration. Existing tenant concentration module covers single-tenant share + rollover concentration; this complements with industry diversification. HHI math: sum of squared percentage shares × 10,000. Antitrust bands map cleanly to CRE industry diversification: <1,500 unconcentrated (diversified), 1,500-2,500 moderately concentrated, >2,500 highly concentrated, >7,500 effectively single-sector. Industry inference via tenant-name keywords across 13 sectors (Technology, Financial Services, Healthcare, Legal & Professional, Government, Education, Retail F&B, Retail Apparel, Retail General, Personal Services, Logistics & Industrial, Hospitality, Media & Entertainment). Production version pulls NAICS codes from lease abstracts. Per-industry breakdown: rent share, tenant count, ordered by share. Surfaces 'this deal IS a bet on industry X's trajectory' for single-sector cases, institutional read material when sector cycles (tech retrenchment, retail apocalypse, biotech funding) materially affect deal performance. Auto-renders only on rent-roll deals (Office / Retail / Mixed-Use).